Two companies, two super-midsize jets, the same delivery quarter. One captures more than $4.6 million in year-one tax value. The other captures barely half its board was promised. The difference was settled before either aircraft left the factory.

The aircraft sales presentation almost always includes the same slide. Under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, it says, business aircraft qualify for 100% bonus depreciation. Buy this airplane, deduct the whole thing this year.

For a lot of buyers, that slide is wrong. Not the law, which is accurately summarized, but the conclusion that it applies to them. Consider two composite buyers drawn from patterns we see across transactions.

Company A: The Early Order

Company A is a profitable industrial manufacturer with an established flight department. In November 2024, wanting to secure a delivery slot, it signed a purchase agreement for a new super-midsize jet at $30 million, with delivery scheduled for the third quarter of 2026. The CFO’s board presentation projected a $30 million deduction in 2026, worth $6.3 million in federal tax.

The problem is the date on the contract. Full bonus depreciation applies to property acquired after January 19, 2025, and acquisition is determined by when a written binding contract was signed, not when the aircraft is delivered. Company A’s jet was acquired under a 2024 contract, so it remains on the phase-down schedule the old law created. Business aircraft that meet the code’s production-period and deposit criteria, as most new jets ordered with deposits do, receive an extra year under that schedule, which means a 2026 delivery qualifies for 40% bonus, not 100%.

Company A’s actual first-year bonus deduction is $12 million, worth about $2.5 million in tax. The remainder is not lost. It is recovered over the aircraft’s five-year depreciation schedule, and in present value terms the economic cost is closer to $400,000 than to $3.8 million. But the company’s 2026 cash tax forecast was overstated by $3.8 million, its board was told something that was not true, and nobody caught it until the tax provision was prepared.

Company B: The Pre-Owned Buyer

Company B, a private equity-backed services platform, took a different path. In May 2026 it bought a three-year-old super-midsize jet from an unrelated seller for $22 million. Used aircraft qualify for full bonus depreciation as long as the buyer has never used the aircraft before and acquires it from an unrelated party.

Company B’s first-year deduction is the full $22 million, worth about $4.6 million in federal tax. On an aircraft costing $8 million less, Company B captured more year-one tax value than Company A.

At least, it would have. Then it set up the ownership structure.

The Use Test That Undoes Good Deals

Aircraft are listed property under the tax code, and bonus depreciation applies only if qualified business use exceeds 50% of total use. Fall to 50% or below and the aircraft moves to straight-line alternative depreciation, with no bonus at all. Fall below that threshold in a later year and previously claimed accelerated depreciation is recaptured.

Company B placed the jet in a special-purpose LLC, which leased it to the operating company, which made it available for executive travel, including a meaningful number of trips by the sponsor’s principals and some personal use by the CEO. Every element of that structure was sensible for liability protection and sales tax planning. Several elements were problematic for the use test. Use by significant owners and related parties, including through leases between related entities, frequently does not count as qualified business use, and personal and entertainment flights reduce the business share further. Company B’s qualified business use, measured properly, came in just under the threshold.

One structure decision, made by counsel focused on a different set of risks, converted a $4.6 million first-year benefit into ordinary straight-line depreciation.

What the Industry Does Not Say

Here is the uncomfortable pattern. Too many aircraft transactions are structured by people optimizing for liability, registration, and sales tax, and then handed to the tax advisor to document after closing. The tax treatment is treated as a consequence of the structure rather than one of its design inputs.

And the “100% bonus” headline has become marketing rather than analysis. Our transaction data shows that buyers of turboprops in the $2 million to $8 million range and light jets in the $3 million to $10 million range are the least likely to have modeled the use test before closing, precisely because they assume a smaller aircraft makes the analysis simpler. It does not.

Before You Sign

Confirm the acquisition date treatment for any aircraft ordered under a contract signed before January 20, 2025, and reset expectations accordingly. Model qualified business use from realistic flight logs, not intentions, and account for how owner, related-party, personal, and entertainment flights will be counted. Design the ownership structure with tax, liability, and operational considerations at the same table, including whether Part 135 charter use by unrelated parties will contribute to business use.

Then consider whether ownership is the right answer at all. A company that cannot meet the use test, or cannot absorb a large first-year deduction, may be better served by a lease from a lessor that can use the depreciation and reflect it in the payments.

Finally, recognize that in a competitive pre-owned market, the aircraft that captures the full benefit is the one you can actually close on. A financing source that can close in 21 days rather than three months is not a convenience when the right airframe is under letter of intent with two other buyers.

The 100% slide is a starting point. What you actually capture depends on decisions made long before delivery.